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This paper critiques dominant corporate social responsibility (CSR) theory, which claims that commercial
and social goals overlap and coincide. It is suggested that this uncritical portrayal and treatment of complex
industry–community relations risks neglecting the potential tensions that may arise should these goals
diverge or be in conflict. In this context, the experiences of residents in a small Western Australian town are
presented to describe a long-running conflict between community members and their corporate neighbour.
The data point to a range of community impacts as a result of corporate activities and unearth strong
differences between ‘local’ and ‘corporate’ understandings of CSR. Based on the perceived shortcomings of
an economically underpinned CSR approach, we question the possibility of meeting local needs by means of
economic efficiency. Calls are made for critical reflection on the key assumptions underlying dominant CSR
theory and consideration is given to questions of guidance for CSR practitioners.
Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a
widely accepted concept (Blyth 2005, Pedersen 2006)
and is traded today as the panacea for many ethical
dilemmas faced by the business community (World
Business Council for Sustainable Development
2000, Berman & Webb 2003, van Marrewijk 2003,
Kemp et al. 2005, Costantinos 2006). An expanding
body of CSR literature emphasises the direct and
indirect economic benefits that can result from the
recognition of social and economic interdependen-
cies (McWilliams & Siegel 2001, Vershoor 2001,
Brammer & Pavelin 2004, Sparkes & Cowton 2004,
Orltizky 2005) and the possible synergies of con-
tributing positively to social cohesion and commu-
nity well-being (Burke & Logsdon 1996, Windsor
2001, Hopkins 2003). It also seems as if the message
that ‘ethics pays’ (Roberts 2003) has started to
resonate with the business sector, evidenced by
growing investments in CSR activities across OECD
countries (Paton & Siegel 2005).
Nonetheless, in spite of the newly found interest in
responsible business conduct, there continue to be
limitations to both CSR theory and practice. The
business realm remains in the spotlight for immoral
business conduct (Cohan 2002, Zalewski 2003, Sarre
et al. 2001), and Q1terms such as ‘corporate social
responsibility’ and ‘business ethics’ continue to be
seen as paradoxical and oxymoronic (Marsden 2000,
Frankental 2001, McKenna & Tsahuridu 2001). In
this context, it is the aim of this paper to offer
empirical insights into two inter-related ‘failings’ of
the dominant strand of CSR theory (after Blowfield
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2005a). A case study of a long-running industry–
community dispute in the South-West of Western
Australia (WA) is used to describe the stark
differences between ‘local’ and ‘corporate’ under-
standings of good CSR practice and to highlight the
problematic of balancing corporate, economic goals
with social expectations at the community level. The
‘failings’ addressed here relate to the economic
capture of social issues and the question of CSR
effectiveness in terms of whose ends CSR meets and
by whom CSR effectiveness is determined.
Firstly, dominant capitalist strands of the CSR
literature are premised on an assumed compatibility
between companies’ profit motive and broader
social and environmental imperatives (Korhonen
2002, Amaeshi & Adi 2007). Paradoxically, this
instrumental approach to CSR serves to legitimise a
corporate status quo, which arguably gave rise to
the CSR debate in the first place. Thus, one ought to
question the extent to which the pursuit of corporate
self-interest can help address those social and
environmental concerns that lie beyond the business
case for CSR (Banerjee 2007).
Secondly, we raise the issue of gauging CSR
effectiveness based on questions surrounding the
judgement of CSR performance (Ryan 2003), the
legitimacy of CSR stakeholders (O’Rourke 2003)
and the social acceptability of CSR practices
(Mikkilä 2003, Gunningham et al. 2004). Critical
in this regard is the issue of power and the way in
which CSR serves the interests of powerful actors in
business–society relationships (Blowfield 2005a).
This also relates to the measurement of CSR
effectiveness, which rarely involves affected mino-
rities at the ‘receiving end of CSR’. These are the
communities living under corporatised skies who
arguably have the highest moral claim (Gibson
2000) within the CSR debate and perhaps a more
suitable vantage point from which to define CSR
obligations and to judge the degree to which they
have been fulfilled.
In sum, this paper critiques what we perceive as
the uncritical and non-reflexive adoption of the CSR
rhetoric and the narrow and self-serving framing of
the CSR agenda. It will be shown that a blinkered
and selective approach to CSR serves to exclude
local voices and dissenting, non-economic rational-
ities, raising doubt over the social acceptability of
the CSR enterprise. These issues will be addressed in
more detail below as part of an overview of, and
critique on, dominant CSR theory before a pre-
sentation of the methods and the case-study data.
A critique of dominant CSR theory
While ridiculed as a joke by the investment and
business community in the 1970s, today, CSR is
almost universally endorsed across all spheres of
society (Lydenberg 2005). This change in sentiment
can be explained in light of the growing need to
harmonise the increasingly visible tensions between
companies and their changing socio-political con-
texts (Idowu & Towler 2004). Dominant CSR
theory has been able to respond to these challenges,
articulating and promoting a business case for CSR
that proved instrumental for the widespread adop-
tion of CSR observable across the business realm.
The limitations and narrow framing of the business
case, however, also set limits to CSR practice.
Early interest in CSR was rooted in critiques of
orthodox economics (e.g. Clark 1916). However, the
capitalist brand of CSR theory, which currently
dominates the CSR field (Korhonen 2002, Amaeshi
& Adi 2007), is underpinned by neoclassical
economic theory (Blowfield 2005a), today’s prevail-
ing social paradigm (Schafer 1994, Lazear 2000,
Korhonen 2002). This brand of CSR is married with
the corporate profit motive and sees business’ key
social welfare contribution in its ability to maximise
shareholder value (Friedman 1970). Although the
hard-nosed shareholder-based approach postulated
in the 1970s has since lost its stronghold in light of
changed expectations on company conduct, the
‘leitmotif of wealth creation’ has remained the
cornerstone of dominant CSR discourses (Windsor
2001).
The language of wealth creation gels with
managerial thought (Amaeshi & Adi 2007) for it
seemingly overcomes the separation of corporate
self-interest and social responsibility as even socio-
economic objectives can be turned into economic
concerns under the banner of ‘enlightened value
maximisation’ (Jensen 2002). The concept’s under-
lying economic rationality provides the business case
for CSR, which has been strongly advocated in
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recent years (World Business Council for Sustain-
able Development 2000, Berman & Webb 2003) in
attempts to maximise company buy-in and to
mainstream CSR practices (Lee 2008). These efforts
are also supported by research that seeks to link
good company conduct to various direct and
indirect business benefits (e.g. Turban & Greening
1997, Hillman & Keim 2001, Hopkins 2003, Lewis
2003, Gunningham et al. 2004, Sparkes & Cowton
2004, Kotler & Lee 2005, Orltizky 2005, Porter &
Kramer 2006). To this day, however, many of these
‘links’ have remained tenuous (Griffin & Mahon
1997, Griffin 2000, McWilliams & Siegel 2001,
Margolis & Walsh 2003, Orlitzky et al. 2003).
The business case for CSR rests on the inter-
dependencies that are said to exist between business
and society for the creation of jobs, wealth and the
improvement of living standards and social condi-
tions (Hoque 1985). The mutual dependence be-
tween business and society gives rise to the principle
of shared value (Porter & Kramer 2006), which
translates community well-being into companies’
long-term interest and is thus perceived to overcome
entrenched perceptions of an incompatibility be-
tween economic and social goals. The strategic
integration of CSR into a framework of total social
responsibility of business (Lee 2008) is believed to
enable firms to link their capabilities with the
opportunities their social environment presents for
the attainment of both societal benefit and compe-
titive advantage (Collis & Montgomery 1995, Miles
& Covin 2000, Munilla & Miles 2005, Porter &
Kramer 2006). It therefore appears that dominant
CSR theory has been able to shake its image of
being a ‘subversive doctrine’ that threatens the very
foundation of free enterprise (Friedman 1962 cited
in Lee 2008) and to evolve into what Wallich &
McGowan (1970) call a ‘new rationale’ that
reconciles social responsibility with shareholder
interests.
It is suggested here, however, that the self-
interested pursuit and strategic selection of social
problems are inherently limited and do not represent
a departure from the contractarian, ‘Friedmanite’
position (after Galbreath 2006). In expounding,
dominant CSR theory effectively seeks to balance
what Banerjee (2006) calls the efficiency–legitimacy
dichotomy. This dichotomy bespeaks the corporate1
situation of being legally obliged to engage in rent-
seeking behaviour while needing to maintain a social
license to operate by demonstrating ‘civic virtue’
(Regan 1998). In this regard, CSR allows for
business as usual with a social twist. CSR beyond
the business case continues to strike as illusory for it
remains irreconcilable with company interests and
legal obligations where the interests of business do
not merge with the interests of society (Newell 2001,
Banerjee 2007). While altruistic or humanitarian
orientations of CSR call for corporate contributions
to social welfare beyond arguments of economic
efficiency (Carroll 1991, Kok et al. 2001), these calls
are dismissed frequently, for they are considered to
fall outside the ‘firm’s proper scope of activities’
(Lantos 2001: 605). Arguably, there lies the tension;
the protection of social interests that economic
orthodoxy does not cater for and laws at times fail
to protect. Social interests seem to remain outside
the corporate mindset, which essentially is an
economic mindset that CSR attempts to ‘socialise’
(after Banerjee 2006), but without challenging its
fundamental values (Blowfield 2005a).
The economic rationality that dominates the CSR
field also tends to dominate other rationalities in
public debates behind a façade of purported
objectivity (Nevile 1997, Handmer et al. 2001, van
Bavel & Gaskell 2004). Within the CSR field, this
has led to the legitimising of exclusive ways of
thinking about CSR and the prevention of a critical
debate (Blowfield 2005a) as dissenting viewpoints
are discredited and rejected. The closedness of
economic rationality (Dryzek 1996, Hamilton
2002, Özel 2002, Fergus & Rowney 2005) potentially
renders an economically underpinned CSR theory
ineffective to address the very social dilemmas it is
meant to solve because its underlying reductionism
only lends itself poorly to a complete understanding
of the CSR problematic. As a result, critical
structural and procedural aspects of industry–
community conflicts as they relate to issues such as
power and stakeholder dissent tend to be overlooked
and to fall outside the realm of critical analysis. It is
argued in this paper in light of the case study
presented below that an openness is required to
dissent as well as an awareness of power differentials
as only then can business–society tensions be
addressed meaningfully.
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With regard to the measurement of CSR effec-
tiveness, which is chiefly part of the managerial
domain (Mikkilä 2003), a similar degree of openness
may be required. This may entail the use of
stakeholder-informed performance appraisals to
qualify and indeed challenge in-house assumptions
about the nature and virtues of CSR practice
without the risk of economic capture and to help
foster what Pater & van Lierop (2006) call ‘shared
sensemaking’ of CSR issues. In this way, systemic
blind spots can be identified and critical reflection
can occur. In contrast, a closed, blinkered or
selective approach to the management of companies’
social environments will only serve to maintain the
status quo. Herein lies the challenge for CSR theory:
needing to provide guidance for the corporate
navigation through messy business–community dis-
putes and enabling connections with the world
beyond the boundaries of cost–benefit analysis. An
open and reflective CSR can help companies deal
with the issues that fall into the discretionary grey
area of ethical CSR (Carroll 1991, Lantos 2001) that
have fuelled the CSR debate for many years. The
case study and subsequent discussion will show why
calls for more debate on these shades of grey are
justified and necessary but also why any optimism
about the corporate embrace of CSR beyond the
business case may be misplaced.
Case study: The Yarloop experience
The small town of Yarloop is located approximately
125 km south of Perth, WA’s state capital (see
Figure 1). Since white settlement in Yarloop in 1849,
the town gained in regional significance due to
agriculture as well as timber and steam engine
production. Over the years, as traditional industries
started to wane, metropolitan ‘lifestylers’ moved to
the area, seeking the peace and tranquillity of rural
living and taking advantage of Yarloop’s geographic
location nestled between the Indian Ocean and
native forest. In the mid 1990s, Yarloop had a
population of approximately 620 residents, who,
compared with the regional average, enjoyed high
levels of household income, high levels of home
ownership (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996a, b)
and prided themselves, as the case study will attest,
8
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Figure 1: Locality of Yarloop in Western Australia
Sources: Google (2007),Q16 Shire of Harvey (2007), Hopper (1992), Beard (1982).
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with a strong sense of place and community
cohesion. In short, Yarloop was seen by residents
as a ‘piece of paradise’.
Today, Yarloop is described by long-term local
residents as ‘a depressing place’, and media coverage
speaks of living ‘at death’s door’ (Bruce 2008),
painting a picture of a ‘dying town’. Over the last 10
years, Yarloop experienced sharp economic decline,
losing most of its local businesses, including two
petrol stations, the local shop and the hospital
(Hepburn 2007). Local statistics attest to a 45%
decline in the region’s population, a decline in
property values and a shift from private home
ownership to rental accommodation (Australian
Bureau of Statistics 1996b, 2002, 2006; Walker
2002, Chartres & Rowland 2004). Overall, around
80% of residents who were living in Yarloop in 1997
are believed to have left the area, signalling dramatic
social changes in the town. Many long-term
residents, who were interviewed during the research
reported on in this paper, attributed this change to
the presence of Alcoa’s Wagerup alumina refinery,
which is located just north of the town’s boundary.
Alcoa is a US-based company and one of the
world’s largest producers of aluminium. In WA,
trading under the name of Alcoa World Alumina,
the company operates two bauxite mines and three
alumina refineries, from where it produces around 7
million tonnes of alumina each year. This accounts
for 13% of the total world demand and delivers
export earnings of around A$2.8 billion (Alcoa
2006a, 2007a). Alcoa prides itself as a significant
contributor to the WA economy and sees itself as
being axiomatic for sustainable development in the
region (Alcoa 2005a, c, g). The company also claims
to be a socially minded and environmentally
responsible business (Alcoa 2005a, 2007b), also
having its achievements in these areas recognised
both nationally and internationally (Reputex 2003,
Australian Mining 2007, Innovest Strategic Value
Advisors 2008). Alcoa promotes itself as a socially
responsible industry leader, claiming that CSR ‘is
ingrained and part of the company’s DNA’ (Alcoa
2009: 5) and to be operating in an open and honest
way, being accountable to its host communities
(Benson 2008).
As will be shown, the company denies claims of
adversely impacting on the health and well-being of
local residents, pointing to a wealth of scientific
studies (e.g. Mercer 2001, Cullen 2002, Cook 2003,
Donoghue & Cullen 2007), which purportedly show
no toxicological link between residents’ health
complaints and the company’s operations. In fact,
Alcoa considers the health and safety of its staff and
local communities in which it operates a top priority
and as integral to its business (Alcoa 2008a).
Alcoa began operations on its present site at
Wagerup in 1984 after having purchased surrepti-
tiously farming properties in the area in the 1970s
(Kelly 1976, Murray 1976). Despite a series of
environmental protests largely organised by envir-
onmental groups from Perth (Hughes 1980) and
concerns expressed by some local residents about the
presence of an alumina refinery on their doorstep
(Langley 1976), the arrival of the industry was
generally welcomed, promising local employment
and income amidst a decline in traditional industries
in the area (Anon 1976, Dames & Moore Con-
sultancy 1978).
Industry–community relations changed in the mid
1990s when Alcoa installed a liquor burner2 at its
Wagerup refinery, which triggered complaints by
refinery workers and local residents about noise,
odour and health problems. Similar problems arose
at Alcoa’s Kwinana refinery following the installa-
tion of a smaller liquor burner unit in 1989
(Southwell 2001). Alcoa attempted to fix technical
problems with the liquor burner at Wagerup and yet
denied any responsibility for adverse health impacts
on the local community, merely making allowances
for impacts in the form of noise and odour (e.g.
Alcoa 2005f, 2006f). While company-internal docu-
ments acknowledge potential health impacts from
refinery emissions (Southwell 2002), Alcoa claimed
repeatedly that the concentrations of harmful
substances were within health and safety guidelines
(evidence given to the Standing Committee on
Environment and Public Affairs 2004, Alcoa 2005f).
Community agitation continued and peaked in
terms of media coverage between 2001 and 2002
(e.g. Utting 2001, 2002) amidst attempts by Alcoa to
introduce a land management plan (Alcoa 2001,
2002), which effectively divided the town of Yarloop
into two different management areas, fuelling
anxiety among community members. This was not
only because a planned buffer zone was seen as an
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admission of something being wrong with the
refinery but also because residents within the
two land management areas were being treated
differently, which served to split the community
(Ross 2003).
Alcoa sought to own the land closest to the
refinery so as to have an effective noise buffer and to
avoid ongoing complaints from local residents
(Miraudo 2001b). This area became known as Area
A, and residents in that area were made offers by the
company to sell their land and properties. Residents
outside Area A initially did not receive buyout
offers, even though they believed they were also
affected by noise and health impacts from the
refinery. While Alcoa eventually also agreed to buy
properties in what became Area B, the properties
purchased were bought at lower prices than proper-
ties in Area A, leading to further community
disquiet. The nature of the conflict changed, no
longer being driven exclusively by fears of impacts
but also equity and financial concerns.
The conflict reached a new height around 2005
and 2006 when the company proposed to expand its
Wagerup operation with a view to almost double its
output capacity (Alcoa 2005b), triggering fears of
larger emissions and community impacts (Flint
2006b). In the face of considerable public opposition
to the proposal (Yarloop and Districts Concerned
Residents’ Group 2005, Community Alliance for
Positive Solutions Inc 2006) and concerns raised by
medical practitioners about unresolved health issues
(Holman et al. 2005, Flint 2006a), the WA state
government approved Alcoa’s expansion plan in
2006 (McGowan 2006). Notwithstanding Alcoa’s
seeming success in having obtained expansion ap-
proval, community agitation continued. While
Alcoa announced recently that it has put its
expansion plans on hold citing the global financial
downturn (Alcoa 2008b), a multi-million dollar class
action is currently being mounted against the
company by local residents (ABC News 2008). The
writ accuses Alcoa of ‘knowingly, negligently and
recklessly operating its factory and poisoning
surrounding communities with toxic emissions’
(Business WA Today 2009). Concurrently, Alcoa
faces court in WA charged by the Department of
Environment and Conservation for alleged pollution
with criminal negligence at the Wagerup refinery
(Australian Associated Press 2009). At the time of
writing, both court cases were ongoing.
In sum, the long-running conflict surrounding the
Wagerup alumina refinery has not been resolved to
date. The case study below will shed light on the
nature and the reasons underlying the persistence of
the conflict.
Method
The data presented below are derived from a series
of interviews conducted as part of a broader inves-
tigation into the Wagerup conflict. The research was
carried out by Brueckner between September 2006
and October 2007, which was initiated in response to
growing community concerns about the proposed
expansion of the Wagerup refinery at the time. The
aim was to document and analyse the long-running
conflict between members of the Yarloop commu-
nity and Alcoa with a view to identifying possible
pathways for a resolution of the Wagerup contro-
versy and to distil lessons for the prevention of
similar industry–community conflicts.
Sampling
Based on snowball sampling (Goodman 1961,
Babbie 1992), data were collected from a broad
cross-section of stakeholders involved in the Wager-
up conflict (see Table 1).3 The snowballing process
commenced with targeted sampling (Watters &
Biernacki 1989) through the identification of a small
group of research participants whose selection was
based on their centrality within the debate but also
their willingness and ability to participate. The
centrality criterion required individuals to have been
‘recognised actors’ in public records such as media
reports (e.g. Manton & Dortch 2003), corporate
communications (e.g. Alcoa 2005d) and parliamen-
tary proceedings (e.g. WA Parliamentary Debates –
Hansard 2006).
A ‘snowball’ of participants emerged as initial
interviews led to further interviews and a successive
widening of the circle of research participants.
Saturation was reached as fewer new names were
being suggested and, most importantly, no addi-
tional insights were gained through the interview
process. The adequacy of the sample size was
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determined by the degree to which divergent views
were covered through the sampling process (Hecka-
thorn 1997).
A volunteer sample complemented the snowball
sample described above. A volunteer sample evolves
through the self-nomination of participants follow-
ing the public announcement of a study (Yin 2003).
In this case, the research was advertised in the local
newspaper and on local radio, inviting respective
readers and listeners to register their interest in
participating. The research was announced publicly
to create awareness of the study as well as to cast a
wide net for the capture of different perspectives.
Based on the two sampling methods used, data were
collected from a total of 81 interviews (Table 1).
Data collection
Because of the exploratory nature of the research,
semi-structured, open-ended interviews were conducted
(Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005). This form of in-depth
interviewing is conversational in style, facilitating the
exploration of complexities and different subjective
interpretations and meanings (Taylor & Bogdan 1998).
It encourages participants to share their views on and
experiences with the issues discussed (Wengraf 2001),
making it a suitable data-collection vehicle for the
purposes of this study. The interviews were recorded,
transcribed verbatim and then imported into QSR
NVivo 7.0 (QSR NVivo 2006) for data analysis.
Data analysis
As this study sought to analyse the nature and
dynamics of the Wagerup conflict based on the
perceptions of different research participants, a
thematic analysis was used for the analysis of the
interview data (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, Braun &
Clarke 2006). Thematic analysis involves the encod-
ing qualitative data in the search for patterns and
themes that help explain social phenomena (Aron-
son 1994, Boyatzis 1998, Fereday & Muir-Cochrane
2006). Themes are developed through the careful
iterative and reflexive examination and re-examina-
tion of the raw interview data (Rice & Ezzy 1999).
The data analysis began with the inductive coding of
important moments, which capture the richness of
social phenomena (Boyatzis 1998). ‘Emerging themes’
were counted as themes in this study when interview
data addressed the guiding research questions.
 What gave rise to the conflict?
 How have you (family, friends, community) been
impacted?
 What continues to drive the conflict?
 How can the conflict be solved?
A subsequent search for commonalities and differ-
ences among the individual accounts of the Wagerup
conflict led to the clustering of themes (Platt 1981).
The use of clusters was based on assumptions about
the homogeneity of conflict stakeholders’ views of
the events at Wagerup. The validity of these
assumptions was tested throughout the study via
constant reference to the interview data and the
triangulation of the interview data with information
derived from other Wagerup-related data sources
such as corporate communications and media re-
ports as well as public inquiries and research reports.
The themes that emerged from the interviews were
pieced together to form a comprehensive picture of
research participants’ experiences of the events at
Wagerup. Each theme contained selected interview
fragments, which were left intact as much as possible
so as to minimise author intervention. Select inter-
view data shown in this paper are presented
parenthetically to enable participants to tell their
story. For confidentiality reasons, however, indivi-
dual participants cannot be identified.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .







Local residents Target sampling 4
Snowball sampling 51
Volunteer sampling 5
Company staff Target sampling 2
Snowball sampling 3
Volunteer sampling 2
Media Snowball sampling 2
External consultants Target sampling 2
Snowball sampling 3
Public servants Snowball sampling 4
State politicians Snowball sampling 2
Volunteer sampling 1
Total 81
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Business Ethics: A European Review
Volume ]]] Number ]] October 2010
r 2010 The Authors










































































































Statistical representativeness was not a prime
requirement for this study as its key objective was
to understand a complex social process. None-
theless, as the majority of interviews conducted
involved community members, ‘informant represen-
tativeness’ ought to be addressed here (Miles &
Huberman 1993). It is understood that the sampling
techniques used proved to be prone to selection bias.
However, through the use of different sampling
techniques, an attempt was made to exhaust the
discourse variety to a point where no new data could
be obtained from further interviews. The representa-
tiveness of opinions, events and activities (Miles &
Huberman 1993) was ascertained through the
detailed description of the history of the conflict
and of other pertinent, contextual information using
different data sources. Therefore, strong sentiments
expressed during interviews could be interpreted in
light of rich external data. Furthermore, much time
was spent to establish an indepth understanding of
the research setting during the data-collection
process. Over a period of 12 months, regular visits
to Yarloop and extended stays helped develop an
enhanced familiarity with, and sensitivity to, the
specifics of the local setting (Mays & Pope 1995),
facilitating learning and context-bound extrapola-
tion (Patton 1990). Overall, data robustness was
ascertained through the corroboration of interview
data with information derived from other sources
and close attention to context.
Also, in terms of validity, member checks were
used to ensure that both the interview tran-
scripts and the research findings yielded a ‘faithful’
depiction of participants’ experiences (Miles &
Huberman 1993). During the data analysis, feed-
back was also sought from colleagues who were
asked to ‘play devil’s advocate’ (Marshall & Ross-
man 1995) to critically question the approach
adopted in this study and the conclusions reached.
To this end, select findings of this study were also
presented at a university research seminar (Brueck-
ner 2009) and at an international conference
(Brueckner 2008). The feedback provided at these
events helped us remain theory-minded (Patton
1990) and aided critical reflection on assumptions
and inferences made.
This study intended to capture multiple experi-
ences with, and perceptions of, the same social
phenomenon. We sought to arrive at a coherent,
stakeholder-informed account of the events at
Wagerup, identifying commonalities and points of
difference in an opaque, emotionally charged and
very complex, politicised conflict. Consequently,
multiple, highly subjective and conflicting readings
of this conflict were to be expected (Burr 2003). In
this regard, at issue here is not the objectivity of the
results but their trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba
1986). Therefore, the results presented below, the
limited generalisability of which we recognise, ought
not to be judged in terms of their truthfulness but
their usefulness to research and their contribution
(Denzin & Lincoln 2000, Burr 2003) to the CSR
debate.
Research paradigm
Following the critical research’s agenda of social
critique (Kincheloe & McLaren 1994), we side with
the least powerful participants in this conflict; these
are the community members who claim to be
adversely affected by the presence and activities of
their corporate neighbour. These community mem-
bers are considered ‘vulnerable’, a social construc-
tion broadly understood here in terms of individuals
lacking choice and control over their own destiny
and being affected by the actions of others
(Armstrong 1997). More specifically, vulnerability
relates to both experienced status inequality (Liam-
puttong & Ezzy 2005) and experiences of real and
perceived harm (Moore & Miller 1999). Status
inequality refers to small communities frequently
lacking autonomy and the resources to defend their
rights and quality of life or to gain access to decision
makers to improve their situation (Adams & Hess
2001, Dovers 2002, Ross 2007). The experience of
real or perceived harm relates to the exposure to
risks to community welfare, the lack of access to
safeguards for community protection and to having
experiences of harm recognised (Wakefield 1996,
Hewitt 1997).
We intend to foreground the voices of so-called
‘hidden’ or ‘invisible’ community members (Liam-
puttong & Ezzy 2005), individuals who are often
unable to be heard in the spheres where politics and
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economics meet and where their lives are affected by
decisions made about regional development. By
championing and promoting subordinate commu-
nity discourses, we hope to shed light on the impact
of power and politics at work in industry–commu-
nity conflicts and in this context problematise the
dominant CSR discourse (Burman & Parke 1993),
which was shown earlier to be uncritical in its
portrayal of industry–community relations and
existing power dynamics (Blowfield 2005a).
Findings: intangible issues of conflict
Because of its complex nature, the Wagerup conflict
cannot be dealt with here in its entirety. Therefore,
attention is focused on a selection of key issues only.
Much of the Wagerup conflict was driven by con-
cerns about health and financial compensation.
However, issues such as these will need to be deter-
mined by the courts and are not the subject of this
paper. The issues presented below are related but far
less intangible social issues, which were identified by
Yarloop residents and were also captured by pre-
vious community-based inquires (Croft 2005, Walk-
er 2005). As will become apparent, these issues were
integral to the community4 disquiet about Alcoa’s
Wagerup operation and included perceived impacts
on:
 families and friends;
 historical connections;
 future dreams and plans; and
 quality of life.
The above issues were selected because they are at
risk of being overlooked in CSR debates, which are
often centred on issues that can be measured,
quantified and, if the need arises, monetised. Intan-
gible values, however, such as people’s connection to
place, are often not articulated, inherently difficult
to measure and therefore likely not to be registered
by a quantitatively driven, rational CSR mindset.
Yet, the case study highlights that values such as
these are deep-rooted and their overriding can serve
to aggravate conflict despite rational attempts at
problem resolution.
As indicated earlier, in the eyes of long-term
residents, Yarloop was a place with ‘a very close knit
community’, strong social cohesion and good
quality of life.
It was an absolutely wonderful little town. Every-
body looked after everybody.
The community at that point . . . was very close
knit. People would help one another, if someone
was in need or needed financial help or had pro-
blems, someone would come along and give you a
hand.
By comparison, Yarloop today was described by the
same residents as being ‘totally different now,
because . . . a good 80% . . . of the original residents
have sold up and left the town.’ These days, life in
Yarloop was considered ‘scary’ and ‘horrible’. The
place was seen as a ‘ghost town’ where ‘the quality
of life . . . ha[d] just disintegrated’.
Dead! It just doesn’t seem to have any life any
more.
A shit-hole! Honestly, I could not live there . . . the
atmosphere, what you can see in Yarloop, it has
deteriorated that much.
These changes were attributed to Alcoa’s operation
and the impacts it was having on the community.
One impact most local residents cited in connec-
tion with the enduring Wagerup conflict was the toll
it took on families. Health problems or the fear of
being affected by pollution from the refinery have
led to much family-internal friction, the up-rooting
or the separation of close family units.
The families have all broken up. It was a very
family community and everyone knew each other
and that’s not there any more, it’s all broken off.
People have split up and gone to different towns,
different places due to the threat of pollution from
Alcoa and future expansion from it and people
have moved on.
My grandchildren no longer come here because
they get sore eyes, itchy skin, blood noses and all
the classic symptoms of the effects of Alcoa, so my
grandchildren won’t come here.
Well, it was either [move] or get a divorce . . . In the
end, [my partner] said we either sell up or I’m out of
here, and I couldn’t blame her. She’d had enough.
The effects on families were also felt more widely
because of an exodus of many long-term residents,
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which meant that not only were family relationships
being affected but also friendships across town,
disrupting a large part of the community.
So my loss is the friendship, the connection I’ve
had with all the friends and people I grew up with.
Now there’s probably only a handful left at this
point.
The social connection, the friendship, the people
looking after each other, the way this town was
close and worked together. That part of it there is
gone and that’s what I miss the most . . . the part of
the friends that I had. Yeah, it isn’t the same town
I used to know.
As a result of the local upheaval, many residents
expressed a sense of depression and resentment
towards Alcoa.
I don’t like living in Yarloop any more because of
the negative attitude portrayed about the town and
just the negativity of living here.
I have lost a great deal of my enjoyment of life. I
have only got one considered friend left in town
and he’s stranded here because he can’t get out.
It’s a very bitter town. People are very angry
Impacts were also felt in other areas of residents’
lives, impacts that went beyond people and prop-
erty. There was a widespread sense of emotional loss
as it relates to local history as well as residents’
future plans and quality of life. With regard to
people’s historical connection to Yarloop, locals
were grieving the loss of long-standing family ties to
the area, and as residents moved away from the
area, local family histories became fractured.
I was third generation Yarloopian and [my
children were the] fourth generation . . . in
Yarloop. There will never ever be a fifth generation
. . . in Yarloop. That’s my history gone . . .
. . . there is an emotional thing in moving from
somewhere where you’ve been – you’ve had
generations of family that have established what
you’ve got, that’s hard to replace, it can never be
replaced.
Many residents, especially farmers, had long-term
plans for their retirement and the hope of being
able to hand over family farms to their children,
which were seen to have been disrupted by impacts
the refinery was believed to be having on the
community.
I always intended to stay there for ever and a day
because my son was going to take on the farm, and
we had about four acres there and we built a new
home and we had it going pretty good and
everything was going pretty good until the kids
came along and they were getting crook.
It’s just disappointing how it’s turned out. Well,
for me, I thought I had my life mapped out. And
now I’ve had the rug pulled from underneath me.
The statements illustrate the impact felt by local
residents from having Alcoa as their corporate
neighbour. It will be shown below that local expe-
riences such as these, however, were marginalised by
Alcoa and not recognised as legitimate CSR issues
because the company denied having adverse impacts
on the community.
Alcoa’s interpretation of the conflict
Alcoa staff agreed that the installation of the liquor
burner in the mid 1990s gave rise to the conflict.
Staff conceded that ‘Alcoa had a great deal of
difficulty in getting the plant to operate effectively
and operate the way it was designed’. Yet, opera-
tional problems on site were not seen to be related to
community complaints about poor health. Instead,
health symptoms were largely considered psychoso-
matic manifestations.
I think around this whole issue from a health
perspective and particularly a public health per-
spective it’s a very fragile thing and if people think
that they’re unwell they will be unwell. . . . as issues
were raised others realised that they’ve been
affected and so you ended up with a lot of people
believing that they’ve been affected.
Alcoa staff seemed convinced that the Wagerup site
was ‘the most measured piece of atmosphere in the
world’. Thus, there was a view that ‘[Alcoa] had all
[its] bases covered, [the company] had all [its]
measurements. [Alcoa] had all of the health guide-
lines and so forth and there wasn’t an issue . . . since
[the company] ha[d]n’t really been able to find
anything that would create a conventional health
risk’. This meant that community concerns were
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countered with science, which also served to harden
the company’s conviction that it was ‘doing no
harm’. However, local residents questioned Alcoa’s
certainty and challenged corporate science.
I just don’t think they know what they’re doing.
They’re not going to do anything about the
emissions because quite simply they don’t know
where a lot of them are coming from, and they
don’t know how to control them.
. . . the pure and simple fact is that the science of
chemicals is still in its infancy and certainly the
medical aspect of that is even further in its infancy
Alcoa recognised that local residents ‘felt like the
refinery was intruding on their lives but they
couldn’t get out’. In response to this, Alcoa
developed its land management plan with the aim
that ‘people could leave gracefully if they wanted to’.
[We] issued a land management strategy and the
idea was that it identified a line around the refinery
. . . and what it said was Alcoa would like to own
the land within that area and so it would put an
offer on the table for anyone who lived in that
area. . . . The idea was that if people closest to the
refinery really wanted to leave then Alcoa would
help them do that.
The creation of Area A resulted in community
outrage because ‘there was a perceived inequity
there’, which is why Alcoa expanded its land
management plan, and ‘Area B was put in place to
address some of the inequity’. ‘The consequences of
that . . . [however] were fairly dramatic’ as different
buyout offers to local residents served to divide the
town and intensify perceptions of inequity. None-
theless, the price differential was considered justified
‘[b]ecause Alcoa [could} not find a bit of science that
says it’s having an impact out there [Area B] . . .’.
Local expectations of CSR
For many community members, process was a
decisive aspect of the Wagerup conflict as percep-
tions of poor treatment were believed to have fuelled
the conflict. In this context, local residents expressed
the expectations they had of Alcoa for dealing with
the conflict. Broadly, these expectations can be
captured under the four headings listed below:
 fix your problems;
 be open and honest;
 be accountable; and
 be respectful and compassionate.
First and foremost, many residents did not seek
compensation nor did they wish to be bought out by
Alcoa. Primarily, there was a desire for the company
to improve its operations so as not to impact on the
community.
It was never an issue of selling up and moving out
of town; it was for Alcoa to fix up the problem on
their side of the fence. And we stated that very
publicly . . . that we want you to fix it; we don’t
want to move away; we want you to fix the
problem.
The majority, or all the people I know of, actually
said ‘Fix your problem. Leave the town alone’.
There was also a sense that the company should
have been more open and honest in the way it was
dealing with the community when problems first
started to emerge.
If they had of been straight out, open and honest
and . . . even just a little bit generous, people
wouldn’t have been worried. They would have
even sat down at the table to work out how to stay
in Yarloop rather than move out of Yarloop.
In this regard, Alcoa also stood accused of not being
accountable in the eyes of residents for the damage
the company caused, denying that problems existed.
This also served to highlight the power differentials
at play, as there was a sense that ultimately the
company determined the process.
Number one . . . is to acknowledge the problem
exists rather than just flatly deny and continue to
claim ‘We operate the world’s best practice, we are
a benchmark’.
Alcoa ain’t gonna move. Nobody wants Alcoa to
stop production. We want them to be accountable.
We’re just little nothings to them.
It was always what Alcoa wanted, how they
wanted and when they wanted [it] regardless of
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what anybody else thought, wanted, desired or
anything else, and that’s how the process has been.
Importantly, the question of how the company
engaged with the community was seen as critical. A
missing aspect, according to residents, was an
element of respect and compassion that purportedly
would have helped diffuse the situation.
Well, they shouldn’t have come in and treated the
locals originally like hillbillies, country hicks.
They didn’t care less; they didn’t care because they
didn’t believe us. They actually sat there and
mocked me.
Show a bit of compassion. That’s right, that’s what
you want.
You’ve got a company that doesn’t have any
scruples morally vs. people with feelings.
In summary, the statements provide an indication
about the degree to which community members felt
affected by what they perceived as the deterioration
of the social relationships within their community as
well as those between the company and Yarloop
residents. In what follows, local sentiments are
compared with responses from Alcoa staff, which
combined will inform an ensuing analysis and
discussion.
Alcoa’s responses to the conflict
This section details some of Alcoa’s response’s to the
Wagerup conflict as they relate to matters of
process. It will be shown that the company seem-
ingly focused rigidly on ‘good’ consultation princi-
ples such as openness and transparency. However,
the social acceptability and suitability of these
measures were seemingly not considered. Also, it
bears note at this stage that the processes used by
Alcoa and their respective community impacts were
judged differently by managers within the company
(‘there are lots of different views within Alcoa in
terms of how it was handled’). An analysis of the
heterogeneity of views held within the company,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper (for a
detailed analysis of company-internal dynamics, see
Brueckner & Ross, forthcoming). The selected
comments below lend expression to the dominant
company response that is also mirrored in corporate
communications and ultimately determined the
nature of the conflict.
Alcoa managers believed that the company
engaged with the community in good faith, giving
people ample opportunity to voice their opinions
and having input into the company’s decision
making with regard to land management and other
operational issues. Over the years, many forums and
working groups were established that were open for
anybody to attend.
The people who went on the working groups self-
elected; they self-selected. As I said to you there
were litigants on those groups.
We advertise it in the paper and if there’s a
particular agenda item they’re interested in they
can come; they can come for one meeting or they
can come for as long as they like.
Yet, many of these forums were not being attended
by local residents critical of Alcoa because it was felt
that the meetings were ‘[b]iased completely towards
Alcoa’. As suggested by local residents:
They would select who could be on it and then they
would boost these people up and give them big ego
boosts by saying that you are representing your
community, well done fellows. Then they would
walk into the committee meeting and say ‘This is
what we are going to achieve today. . . . to me that
is not what I consider community consultation.
With regard to corporate communications, staff
believed that Alcoa kept the community adequately
informed, confirmed by the positive feedback the
company received from the community.
. . . we had a lot of different facets to the
engagement framework one of which was these
newsletters and we’ve had some really interesting
feedback from them. . . . we’ve had feedback . . .
and the majority reckoned that the amount of
communication is about right. People want to
know a lot; they want to know in a form that’s
very digestible for them and for their families.
Alcoa’s media campaign was focused heavily on the
local and regional economic benefits the refinery and
its future expansion would bring to the region,
citing, inter alia, increases in local employment, tax
revenue and infrastructure developments (Alcoa
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2006b, c). Emphasis was also placed on the support
the company received from local residents, busi-
nesses and company employees (Alcoa 2006b, d).
Dissenting voices were also targeted by company
advertising in local newspapers, accusing what was
called a ‘small minority’ of making ‘false allegations’
and ‘exaggerated claims’ based on ‘personal agen-
das’ (Alcoa 2006e). The ‘attacks’ against Alcoa were
labelled ‘counter-productive and based on misinfor-
mation’, adversely ‘impact[ing] community morale’
(Alcoa 2006e). Overall, there was a strong belief
among Alcoa management that dissidents consti-
tuted only a small section of the community, which
did not represent the wishes and aspirations of the
wider community.5
What we see is the vast majority of people want to
stay there. They’re happy. They want the town to
prosper. . . . We’re pretty confident that that’s what
people want to do and that’s the truth. . . . We
hope very much [the expansion goes ahead]
because there will be a lot of disappointed people
if it doesn’t; people who want to see the jobs.
The majority of people are pretty comfortable and
happy to stay there and want the town to go
ahead.
Between 2002 and 2006, the number of community
complaints to the company had declined, which was
attributed, among other factors, to changes in the
way the company responded to community con-
cerns. This in turn was seen as a gauge for success.
There were changes made to the land management
policy. There were some very big changes made to
engaging people and listening to people, like the
community, and there were also some emission
changes made during that time including further
noise reductions but . . . the thing for Alcoa is . . .
that the number of complaints has decreased
greatly.
Overall, Alcoa staff conceded that mistakes had
been made over the last 10 years in terms of
preventing and managing the Wagerup conflict. At
the same time, there was a belief that the company
had learnt from its mistakes and started to engage
more effectively with the local community (Osborn
2004).
Discussion and concluding comments
The case study gave voice to local perceptions of real
or perceived harm resulting from Alcoa’s Wagerup
refinery, which were shown to be at the core of this
industry–community dispute. Alcoa’s former mana-
ging director Wayne Osborne issued an unreserved
apology to the community on behalf of the
company. However, the issues driving this conflict
have not disappeared. The ongoing controversy is
indicative of high levels of continued community
unease and resistance, reflecting poorly on past
attempts to solve the conflict. As suggested by the
Standing Committee on Environment and Public
Affairs (2004: 370), which conducted a 3-year
investigation into the events at Wagerup, ‘Alcoa
failed to adequately recognise and respond to the
complaints it received from . . . the local commu-
nity’, lacking to offer a comprehensive response to
the range of serious and complex issues developing
at the Wagerup refinery, which resulted in a break-
down of trust between the company and the local
community.
Alcoa seemingly adopted a single rationality for
dealing with the Wagerup conflict, which we regard
as an economically underpinned closed system
approach that arguably fuelled community outrage
and ultimately led to the derailment of industry–
community relations. The Wagerup conflict evolved
initially through what can be described as a sequence
of inappropriate responses by Alcoa to community
concerns, with the company dissociating itself from
the problem by denying wrong-doing and impact.
By its own admission, Alcoa took ‘a very strong-
armed view’, using legalistic and scientific arguments
as a means of countering community complaints (see
Donoghue & Cullen 2007). The science surrounding
Wagerup, however, was contested as health impacts
were shrouded with uncertainty in the face of
knowledge gaps and imperfect science (Standing
Committee on Environment and Public Affairs
2004).
Community members have long been suspicious
of the scientific certainty postulated by Alcoa and
the company’s claims about the safety of its refinery
emissions. From the community’s perspective, there
needed to be ‘something in the air’ (Anon 2005) to
explain local health problems (Miraudo 2001a),
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community agitation (Holker 2005) and the mass
exodus from Yarloop (Ferguson 2006, Pemble
2008). Emerging findings from ongoing research
and monitoring in the Wagerup area (e.g. Calhoun
et al. 2008, Holmes 2008), which only recently led to
a tightening of Alcoa’s licensing conditions and
more stringent air quality controls, arguably vindi-
cated community concerns (Flint 2008). Alcoa
seemingly relied on what Giddens (1990) describes
as public trust in the expert system and the inability
of laypeople to deal with, or counter complex
science (Ophuls & Boyan 1992). However, Alcoa’s
attempt to use science to legitimate its claims merely
gave rise to local perceptions of the ‘untrustworthi-
ness of science’ (after Wynne 1995) because of a
mismatch between the scientific claims and residents’
lived experiences. The recent release of findings from
ongoing research only hardened these perceptions.
However, the community’s ‘Pyrrhic victory’ does
not undo the social changes experienced locally and
highlights the problems associated with scientific
dogmatism in the face of risk and uncertainty.
As the Wagerup conflict continued and intensified
over the years, inappropriate so-called second-order
responses (see Crombie 1997, Emery 1997) by the
company seemed to follow. These responses relate to
Alcoa’s initial attempts at solving local problems
and subsequent hostility towards local dissent.
Alcoa’s approach to dealing with continued com-
munity agitation was the development and release of
a land management plan. However, the company’s
attempt to buy out affected community members,
which Alcoa considered a sign of good will,
manifested as a stereotypical Type III error (Mitroff
1998), offering the perfect solution to the wrong
problem. It seems as if the company trusted that by
enabling residents ‘to sell and leave the town with
dignity’ locals would be willing to accept financial
compensation when offered a way out. Yet, the case-
study data suggest that affected participants had no
desire to relocate but instead wanted ‘Alcoa to fix its
problems’ with the refinery. The differential treat-
ment of residents in areas and A and B only seemed
to add insult to injury.
In terms of dealing with community dissent, the
case study indicates that Alcoa company built on its
support from allies, focusing on the positive feed-
back it received from select community members,
employees and local, mining-dependent businesses.
At the same time, dissenting voices were being
attacked and discredited through company news-
letters and newspaper advertisements. This polarisa-
tion ultimately resulted in a stalemate with the
company becoming increasingly cocooned amidst
spiralling community unrest. Consequently, learning
opportunities were being missed by the company as
attention was focused largely on what was deemed a
majority viewpoint. The resultant systemic blind
spots prevented a meaningful and empathetic
engagement with marginalised viewpoints, the re-
presentativeness of which remains hotly contested
(compare Community Alliance for Positive Solu-
tions Inc 2005, Alcoa 2006e).
The company’s selectivity raises questions about
stakeholder legitimacy and the validity of stake-
holder grievances. It appears that views that were
well aligned with Alcoa’s business and long-term
perspective for the region were used strategically to
bolster the company’s media campaign. In contrast,
dissent that ran counter to the company’s objectives
was seen as unrepresentative and illegitimate. Alcoa
seemingly understood its approach to CSR in terms
of the company’s social contributions such as
employment, tax revenue and philanthropic expen-
ditures, which an expansion of the refinery promised
to increase even further. Arguably, as evidenced by
corporate communications, this is also how Alcoa
understood its role in the regional sustainable
development context (e.g. Alcoa 2005e). While this
economic rationale resonated with Alcoa’s support
base in the community, social issues that mattered to
marginalised residents such as impacts on family ties
and social connections were seemingly overlooked.
This is why the rational, economic mindset is
considered bounded (Kasper 1997) or blinkered
(Daly & Cobb 1989) for it is prone to dismiss the
value of different perspectives and to be insensitive
to social complexities. Thus, we join the chorus of
other authors (Blowfield 2005a, b, Banerjee 2006)
questioning its suitability as a foundation for CSR
theory.
With regard to the question of CSR effectiveness,
it comes as no surprise that Alcoa and members of
the Yarloop community arrived at diametrically
opposed conclusions. While from the company’s
point of view the situation improved in light of
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reduced complaint figures, local residents saw their
lives and their community change dramatically. To
contextualise the decline in community complaints,
it warrants note that by 2006, Alcoa owned most of
the land in Area A and numerous properties in Area
B. These properties are rented out to tenants, who
signed lease agreements in which they agree not to
take action against the company (see an excerpt
from a lease agreement below).
The tenant agrees that it will not make any claim
or lodge any formal complaint against Alcoa for
loss of quiet enjoyment of the premises as a result
of any damage or nuisance arising from or in
connection with any noise, odour, dust or pollu-
tion, or disturbance generated as a consequence of
the business activities of Alcoa.
The company denies suggestions, however, of
gagging its tenants, stating that the lease agreements
do not stop them from making a complaint (Flint
2006c). Nonetheless, Alcoa’s dominance on the local
property market may in part explain the decline in
the complaint figures and the lack of local trust in
any claims that issues on the ground have been
resolved. In fact, the relocation of Yarloop police
officers to the nearby town of Harvey due to health
concerns (Buggins et al. 2006) and health warnings
issued to public housing tenants by the Department
of Housing and Works (Flint 2006c) heightened
local perceptions of being misled about the safety of
refinery emissions.
The case-study data indicate that in determining
the company’s social responsibility Alcoa seemingly
sought to match the organisation’s values with those
of powerful outside stakeholders, yet arguably at the
expense of less powerful actors. Problem definition,
issue selection and directions for conflict resolution
were defined by like-minded people sharing similar
values. The same ‘group think’ problem also seems
to apply to the measurement of success. Conse-
quently, Alcoa was never likely to arrive at CSR
outcomes it could trust to be effective or reliable as
they were not tested by ‘fringe stakeholders’ (Pater
& van Lierop 2006) with high personal stakes and
also relevant knowledge about local issues. There is
a risk that companies focus exclusively on stake-
holders who can help improve their financial
situation or competitive advantage (Banerjee 2006),
leaving little room for the interests of marginalised
stakeholders. Yet, as the case study illustrates, fringe
perspectives demand attention, a shared under-
standing of conflict issues and empathetic responses
by companies before local problems and issues of
conflict can be resolved. This, however, is contingent
on the willingness of powerful conflict stakeholders
to acknowledge that problems exist and that
processes for conflict resolution are used that are
acceptable especially to marginalised stakeholders.
As pointed out by Frankental (2001), this critical
faculty on the part of companies is often found to be
missing.
The importance of meaningful company stake-
holder engagement is widely recognised (e.g. Miles
et al. 2006). At the same time, it is commonly held
that companies are torn in various directions by a
multitude of stakeholders and therefore need to be
pragmatic and strategic in determining the legiti-
macy of stakeholders and CSR issues (Orlitzky et al.
2003). In the end, decisions such as these are made
based on managerial values and discretion. Unsur-
prisingly, in this regard, stakeholders with legiti-
macy and urgency but limited power (‘dependent’
stakeholders) continue to find themselves over-
looked and kept outside the circle of so-called
‘definitive’ stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, custo-
mers, employees) (Mitchell et al. 1997, Agle et al.
1999). Benn & Dunphy (2007) make the point that
traditional stakeholder management approaches –
premised on market fundamentalism and individu-
alism – lack inclusiveness and do not meaningfully
inform good governance especially as it relates to the
management of power differences and risk. This
may also explain calls to end the search for
stakeholder priority and to move towards new laws
and social contracts that spell out social and envi-
ronmental criteria for companies’ licences to operate
(Elkington & Fennell 1998, Banerjee 2001). This
would help eliminate the problem of stakeholder ex-
clusion based on managerial judgement and values.
Business at all cost is no longer socially acceptable
(Welford 2008), and yet old ways of doing business
are still alive and well. While companies like Alcoa
have adopted successfully the language of enligh-
tened self-interest and are recognised for their CSR
performance (e.g. Reputex 2003), they continue to
be in the spotlight for adverse community impacts
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(e.g. Flint 2007). In the face of growing pressure for
changes to corporate law (Cavanagh & Mander
2004) and calls for a seemingly forgotten honesty
that companies cannot be expected to be socially
responsible (Reich 2008), proponents of dominant
CSR theory continue to invest faith in their ability
to change. Yet, we challenge this ability and
willingness of companies to go beyond the para-
meters of economic efficiency and call for rigorous
review and empirical testing of the assumptions
underlying the dominant school of thought within
the CSR field.
In Australia, future industry–community conflicts
almost strike as a certainty. The industrialisation of
rural areas in WA is intensifying in regions where
human settlements coincide with areas of great
resource richness, high biodiversity as well as social
and cultural values (compare Beard et al. 2000,
Sleeman Consulting & Goodall and Business and
Resource Management 2004), providing much am-
munition for friction between industries and their
host communities. In this context, open public debate
and the negotiation of new social contracts for
industry–community relations may help determine
the social acceptability of industry and the trade-offs
associated with industrialisation and development.
While communities have the right not to be
harmed by industry (Raffensperger & Tickner
1999), the onus of proof often rests with affected
individuals. In this regard, shifting the onus of proof
onto companies, especially in industries where much
scientific uncertainty about impacts still remains,
may help protect communities affected by industrial
activities. This may also need to be accompanied by
a stronger push for scientific competency in deci-
sion-making processes on the policing, governance
and control of potentially harmful industries (Tick-
ner 2003). In the end, however, despite recent
amendments to corporate and environmental laws
in Australia (Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Corporations and Financial Services 2006, Frost
2007), far-reaching policy changes in the near future
seem unlikely. This means that companies will need
to continue navigating ‘discretionary’ ethical grey
areas without needed legislative guidance. Unfortu-
nately, it is our view that within this regulatory void
dominant CSR theory is currently ill-equipped to
provide a reliable moral compass.
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Notes
1. Implicated here are corporations in countries such
as Australia and the United States, where share-
holder interests are given first priority (Francis
1997 cited in Madsen & Ulhøi 2001, Farrar 2008).
In Australia, the Corporations Act (2001) compels
directors to have regard for the interests of
stakeholders other than shareholders. Yet, the
extent to which this fosters corporate practice
beyond strategic, relational CSR is contentious.
2. A liquor burner is designed to remove organic
matter from the caustic soda used in the produc-
tion process of alumina, improving both the
quality and the quantity of the product. However,
the burning of organic material releases volatile
organic compounds as well as carbon monoxide,
sulphur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen. Only four
liquor burners are known to be in operation in the
industry world-wide, three of which are operated
in WA.
3. The study underlying this paper involved partici-
pants from a variety of different stakeholder
groups. However, due to space limitations, this
paper draws primarily on data derived from
interviews with community members and company
staff.
4. The Yarloop community was deeply divided
because it was not universally believed that Alcoa’s
operation was impacting on the town or the health
of local residents. In particular, more recent
arrivals in town who were interviewed did not
share the concerns of long-term residents and
considered Alcoa unfairly targeted. However, an
analysis of the variance between views held on the
level of community and the contributing factors
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
5. The community group ‘Community Alliance for
Positive Solutions Inc.’ (CAPS), which has been
campaigning against Alcoa for a number of years
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on grounds of health and community impacts,
counts over 150 paid members (Community
Alliance for Positive Solutions Inc. 2008). More-
over, even though this study does not lend itself to
statistical analysis, it should be acknowledged that
by mid June 2007, over 400 properties were
registered under the WA state government’s
supplementary property purchase programme
(WA Legislative Council 2007). This programme
enables residents who live outside Alcoa’s land
management areas A and B to sell their properties
to Alcoa under the administration of the Western
Australian state government. For a community the
size of Yarloop, this figure can be considered
significant. Finally, the earlier mentioned class
action underway involving over 140 claimants is
also indicative of the level of community disquiet.
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